Election Assistance Commission Public Hearing of May 5, 2004

On May 5^th  the Election Assistance Commission (EAC - http://www.eac.gov), held a "Public Hearing on the Use, Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems"its first hearing since its recent formation.  The EAC was formed as a result of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, in part to assist in the administration of Federal elections and establish some minimum standards regarding voting systems.

OVERVIEW

The EAC has four members:  Chairman DeForest Blake "Buster" Soaries, Jr. (Secretary of State, NJ, 1999-2002), Vice-Chair Gracia Hillman (former Exec. Director of the League of Women Voters, and Congressional Black Caucus Foundation), Paul DeGregorio (former Director of Elections for St. Louis Co., MO) and Ray Martinez (attorney, former Clinton policy assistant).   [Bios:  http://www.eac.gov/commissioners.asp .]

The agenda included panels on:  Technology, Vendor, Election Administrator, Research/Human Interaction Factors, and Advocacy.  These were preceded by the Commissioners' opening remarks and an Overview of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting from Kimball Brace of Election Data Services.  Panelists (21 in all) gave prepared remarks and then took often-lengthy questions from the Commissioners. 

Materials included written testimony of the speakers and speaker bios for each panel.  The audiencewell over 150included several dozens standing at the back of the room.

At the mid-day break TrueMajority.org held a press conference with great media turnout outside the hearing location (the EPA building), well-hosted by Matt Holland of TrueMajority and featuring the Vote-Eating Computer, local area activists, and speakers Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins University, Linda Schade of TrueVoteMD.org, US Rep. Rush Holt and CA Secretary of State Kevin Shelley. 

After Holt spoke, Jim Dickson (lobbyist for an association for people with disabilities, and opponent of voter-verified paper ballots) approached and spoke out, saying Holt's bill (HR2239 - The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act) delays implementation of accessibility, but Congressman Holt returned to the podium a moment later to correct that statement.  The bill actually amends the original HAVA deadline, calling for accessibility requirements to be met sooner, rather than later.  Secretary Shelley spoke last and was hailed by the admiring crowd appreciative of his recent decisions in California decertifying touchscreens that lack a voter-verified paper ballot.

OBSERVATIONS, LOWLIGHTS, and HIGHLIGHTS

The Panel composition was heavily skewed in favor of persons who oppose voter-verified paper ballots (VVPBs).  Those who favor VVPBs generally were represented by one person per panel.  

In coverage leading up to the Hearing, Chairman Soaries acknowledged the great voting machine controversy and related "serious concerns."  However, in one interview he also described their mission "to restore the public's faith in electronic voting"a far cry from its proper role, to make a fair, objective and well-informed look at voting technologies of all kinds.

The Commissioners seem aware that their year-late and under-funded empanelment has resulted in "cart before the horse" implementation of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).  In reference to new technology being put into use before testing for usability and security that would meet with the public's expectations, Chairman Soaries said it was like "having to round up the horses and build the corral around them."  Some of the questions were very sharp and insightfulall the Commissioners had done extensive homework prior to the Hearing.

Avi Rubin's testimony (Technology Panel) was compelling.  Highlights: 

• He described a spectrum for voting system security that ran from "really really terrible" to "very good" and said current systems have us at "really terrible.
• "We should demand both accessibility AND security."
• His explanation that a key component of trust in any program is having a "trusted computing base"well-scrutinized core code for the system that should be kept as small as possibleyet today's voting systems have a base of 50,000 lines of code on top of millions of lines of code from modifiable programs like Windows CE, making them impossible to "trust."
• Probability of tampering is directly correlated to the incentives for tampering.

Other Technology participants (Stephen Berger, IEEE; Ted Selker, MIT; Brit Williams, Kennesaw University) generally did not favor VVPB, as expected.  Berger:  "It's important to involve all the stakeholders in development of standards."  He said all agree that there is more to be done beyond the 2002 standards, especially regarding security and accessibility.  Lowlight:  Brit Williams: "adding a paper 'receipt' could have an adverse effect."

Soaries asked why the 1990 standards make reference to paper verification, but in the 2002 standards there is no such referencean interesting catch.  None of the panelists recalled any discussion about that, nor any decision made to leave out such reference.

Avi Rubin was asked what we could do to move up that spectrum from 'really terrible' "is VVPB is the only way to secure electronic voting systems?" "Short term answer:  for November 2004, VVPB is necessary.  It's the only way to do an end-run around the security problems, and solves the auditability and recount issues.  Long term, perhaps there will be a cryptographic solution, but VVPB offers the most bang for the buck."

After asking about Rubin's experience as a pollworker for a day, the panel asked whether elections officials should be computer security experts for a day.  "It would help."

The Vendor Panel included representatives of Hart Intercivic, Diebold, ES&S and Sequoiaand Dr. Kevin Chung, of Avante.  His testimony was a highlight, laying waste to the often-heard claims that there are "no certified systems that offer a VVPB" and discussing a 96.5% voter confidence rate (that votes were accurately recorded) on Avante's VVPB system in Sacramento, compared to 76% in GA (Diebold, no VVPB).  And it's accessible.

Another highlight was the Commission's acknowledgement that our voting is a "public proposition being managed by private companies" and the industry's incestuous nature possibly creating a sound basis for suspicion on the part of the public.  He recognized the companies have a financial interest, but that had to be balanced with the country's need for voting with integrity.  He also asked Diebold what lessons they had learned from the outcry after O'Dell's comments regarding electoral votes for Bush. 

One other random highlight - I don't recall who said it, but from my notes:  in 2002 the Los Angeles touchscreens (they deploy a few for early voting only) resulted in a higher undervote rate than their punchcards!!  

Most of what the vendors said was forgettablemarketing fluffbut ES&S did acknowledge they have "several prototypes" in the works for VVPB at present, and are awaiting standards for further development (I didn't hear them mention their AutoMark system an accessible interface to aid voters with disabilities in marking and confirming their optical scan ballots, currently in process for certificationit would make opti-scan fully HAVA-compliant without the need for touchscreens, just the kind of thing this Commission needs to hear).

Lowlight, election officials panel:  Conny McCormack, Registrar of Voters from Los Angeles County, trotting out that ridiculous 37-inch ballot she claims illustrates a VVPB for something like the recall election.  She used that before, with the Voting Systems & Procedures panel in Sacramento.  Were this true, the touch-screen summary page display would have to be a sports-bar-sized giant screen.  Someonepreferably a Los Angeles County voterhas to write a scathing letter to the editor at the LA Times calling her to task for such misleading antics.  It's unacceptable. 

Highlight:  Kevin Shelley's blazing testimony starting with his rebuttal to McCormack's comment (using identical language as used by the voting systems vendors' marketing association ITAA in recent coverage) about decertification of touchscreens in California resulting from "the false claims of a tiny but vocal minority."  Shelley said as a statewide elected official he would never base his decision (to decertify and require security measures) on the false claims of a tiny minority and he didn't know anyone who would. 

He said California's standards for the Accessible Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (AVVPAT) would be ready at the end of this month (May) and he challenged the notion that we can't have these by November.  He urged the Panel to do the same.

Secretary Shelley was asked by Soaries about parallel monitoring.  The EAC seemed to be on the lookout for ways to accomplish what VVPBs would do, but not necessarily with VVPBs.  Parallel monitoring detectsbut doesn't addressdiscrepancies with e-voting machines.  A VVPB allows real-time detection so you could take the offending machine offline immediately, allows for recounts in the case of discrepancies, etc.  Shelley didn't say that, but he did say parallel monitoring (a) should be expanded and (b) can't stand alone as a security measure.

On the advocacy groups panel, Chellie Pingree of Common Cause and Melanie Campbell, head of the Coalition for Black Voter Participation expressed skepticism with DRE's, citing their own professional and personal experiences in elections here and abroad.  The other panelists supported DRE's - the League of Women Voters, La Raza and Jim Dickson, a committed and vocal advocate for voters with disabilities. The League statement showed some cracks in the wallindications that they are not totally immune to the growing concerns and reports about problems with DREsbut the wall has not been breached yet.  Chairman Soaries asked why people wanted a VVPAT from DREs and not from lever machines.  No one on the panel could answer. 

Final thoughts: 

Advocates of DREs tended to focus their arguments in favor of DREs on theoretical safeguards which in application are limited, insufficient or not practiced.  These include:

• procedures and training at the polls (inconsistent at best, non-compliant with election laws at worst),
• hypothetical security measures (which in reality are not followed, and are insufficient without VVPB),
• audit logs and other electronic means of auditability (infrequently used, and proven flawed recently in Florida),
• standards (none current nor comprehensive enough to match the technology in use),
• parallel monitoring(which can detect, but not resolve, malfunction or manipulation) and
• certification (a broken system in practiceall security failures, malfunctions etc. have occurred on certified systems).

Attendance, coverage by C-Span and other media, and the intensive participation of the Commissioners and panelists showed this wasn't "just another hearing…"  Some participants from VerifiedVoting.org's Lobby Days event traveled from NY and NC to attend.  I was pleased to see Kennie Gill was there (Chief Counsel, Committee on Rules & Administration office of Sen. Chris Dodd, one of the co-signers on the "Dear Colleague" letter against amending HAVA with VVPB requirements before the EAC has a chance to do their part). 

At the brand-new EAC website, the Frequently Asked Questions page asks "whether my vote makes a difference."  The answer, that "just" one vote can make a difference, is illustrated by several real-life examples where races were decided by one vote.  Those election results were clarified, and in some cases reversed, upon recount.  With paperless electronic machines those examples WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE.  I hope they realize there are no meaningful recounts without a voter-verified paper ballot. 

Recommendations:

• Continue to send testimony to testimony@eac.gov
• Provide solid refutation to the argument that Georgia and other jurisdictions have had 100% trouble-free experiences.
• The inadequacy of existing security procedures, especially when touted as an alternative to VVPBs, must be refuted, and vigorously.
• Urge the Commissioners to hold a second hearingAS SOON AS POSSIBLEand one with panels considerably more balanced than this first one.

Prepared by Pamela Smith (VerifiedVoting.org) with input from Andrew Silver (ncverifiablevoting.org), Teresa Hommel (wheresthepaper.org)  and Ed Davis (CommonCause.org) in May, 2004