“Imagine, it’s Election Day 2004. You enter your polling place and go to cast your vote on a brand new ‘touch screen’ voting machine. The screen says your vote has been counted. As you exit the voting booth, however, you begin to wonder. How do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote? The fact is, you don’t.” ~ Representative Rush Holt (NJ). The problem is simple: A touch screen voting machine records your vote in the memory of the machine, where you can't see it. How do you know your vote for candidate A wasn't recorded as a vote for candidate B? You don't! Many states and communities are planning to buy massive numbers of so-called "Direct Recording Electronic" (DRE) machines (paperless touch screen are DREs, but there are other kinds of DREs that use dials or switches instead of touch screens). Some are already using them. Unfortunately, these machines are dangerous for democracy. With the computer technology they are using, there is always a risk that a program flaw or, worse, tampering with the software could change votes and even change the outcome of elections. And these changes might not be detected! Since ballots are secret, once the voter leaves the booth there is no one who can detect or correct any errors that the machine made in recording the votes. If the election results are obviously absurd, as happens occasionally with other kinds of vote-counting equipment, the only options will be to accept an obviously wrong election result or hold a new election. The solution is simple: require there to be a "voter verifiable audit trail" with all voting equipment. A voter verifiable audit trail is a permanent record of each vote that the voter can check to ensure that it represents their intent. These votes are deposited in a secure ballot box. If there is a manual recount, we can be sure that the votes being counted are what the voters wanted to cast. Without this requirement, we can never again have confidence that our elections reflect the will of the voters, as opposed to a random error or the will of someone who tampered with the voting machines. HAVA: The Reason Behind The Rush To Install New Voting Equipment HAVA, the Help America Vote Act, was passed by congress in October of 2002. The purpose of the Act is: To establish a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems, to establish the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of Federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain Federal election laws and programs, to establish minimum election administration standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of Federal elections, and for other purposes. <<NOTE: Oct. 29, 2002 - [H.R. 3295]>> It is this Act, with specific dates, that require the States to update old voting equipment so that a similar situation (as what occurred in Florida) will not occur again. In the rush to pass this new Act some key elements were left out, such as a "voter verifiable paper receipt". The newest Act, introduced by Representative Rush Holt, hopes to update the original HAVA Act with specific solutions to the question of voter verified paper receipts and other obvious discrepancies. More on HAVA More on HAVA Deadlines How I Can Help?

Here are links to brief statements and summaries of the problem.  Johns Hopkins/Rice Study A major electronic voting machine maker, Diebold, has its "leaked" source code evaluated by computer scientists - BAD NEWS for Diebold!  FAQ If you only read one thing on this topic, you should probably read our Questions and Answers page to address basic questions that come up regularly.  PPT Presentation Here is an abbreviated presentation David Dill gave: (Powerpoint). It gives a good overview of the problem as of June 6, 2003.  Recorded Interviews A story produced by Free Speech Radio News, which includes interviews with Rebecca Mercuri and David Dill.  A statement by Rebecca Mercuri.  An essay by Kim Alexander of the California Voter Foundation.  Letter from the USACM to the House Science Committee.  Peter Neumann's catalog of recent voting machine problems.  An interview on NPR with Peter Neumann and Rebecca Mercuri.