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Home   »  Take Action  »  Resources  »  Voting Technology  »  Guidelines for Observing Central ...


Guidelines for Observing Central Tabulation


Observing the central tabulation of the votes in your jurisdiction is quite different from observing in the polling place and watching the poll-opening and closing procedures. In some cases this may be more “open” to the public, in that you may not have to have credentials from a party or candidate to watch, but keep in mind that this takes place in a much more limited space, and you must make arrangements in advance with the county, township or parish in order to observe.

Tabulator Definition

Generally speaking, the central tabulator is the central computer that tallies the votes and produces the final report for a given county or equivalent jurisdiction.

You should choose whether you can observe at a polling place or observe at central tabulation; you probably won’t be able to do both, and you would want to be at the central count facility when ballot materials begin to arrive from the polling places. If absentee ballots are processed in the same general area, you may be able to observe that process before the central tabulating processes begin.

Some jurisdictions limit the number of observers. Get a comfortable seat and plan to stay until the wee hours. Interesting things happen at the end, when party observers are woozy and may be inattentive, so bring a thermos of coffee and stay alert

Bring ID

Remember to take identification; you may be asked to show it before entering the central tabulating area.

If early voting is allowed in your area, the tabulating process will include the reporting and accumulation of vote totals of (a) early votes, (b) absentee ballots, (c) polling place votes, and finally (d) provisional ballots. Early votes and polling place votes will probably happen first, unless the absentee counting is finished by election night. Provisional ballots are checked first to make sure the voter was eligible to cast the ballot and then counted and added in as part of the final canvass of the vote totals. The canvass might not be completed for as long as 28 days.  

Central Tabulation

Take notes on all your central tabulation observations and all responses to questions.

·        If possible, observe the entire day of operations at the central election office. If the law in your state allows this, insist on it. Log anything out of the ordinary, and log the names of the relevant people.

·        Ask questions about how absentee ballots and early voting ballots are handled.

·        Find out who monitors the modem communications coming in from the precincts to the central tally computer. Does someone check the validity of the transmission before allowing it to be received?

·        Ask if technicians have been required to take the same oath as poll workers to conduct a legal election. Monitor and log calls for assistance the election office receives from the precincts:

1.      Which precinct did the call come from?

2.      What is the problem?

3.      Was a technician dispatched?

4.      How is the technician dispatched?

5.      Did the technician take replacement machines to the precinct?

6.      How long did it take to resolve the problem?

·        Log the names of all people operating the central tally computer. Observe what each one does, if possible.

·        Log the names of the partisan observers.

·        As poll workers bring the reports and memory cards back to election center, notice and log:

1.      Do HQ Poll workers check the seals when they receive the envelopes containing the reports and the memory cards? What happens to the envelopes? Are they tracked?

2.      Do HQ Poll worker register the number of cards indicated in handwriting on the envelope?

3.      What happens to the Zero Total Reports and the End of Day Precinct Totals Report inside the envelopes? Are they removed, saved, logged? Are the totals tracked?

4.      What happens to the memory cards after the HQ Poll worker breaks the seal? What recording does the HQ Poll Worker do? Are the cards counted (there should be one for every DRE)? By whom? How many times? What happens to the accumulator card containing the precinct totals?

5.      Does the HQ poll worker check or verify the serial numbers or any other identifying information on the memory cards?

6.      What happens if none of the cards in an envelope contains the accumulated totals? Is the accumulation process performed on a machine at HQ? Are all the cards from the precinct kept together?

7.      Observe whether data from "accumulator" cards is uploaded to the central computer. Does someone track which precincts have been transmitted by modem and which are to be uploaded from the cards?

·        Observe tabulator and room security. Take notes.

·        Ask the name and employer of everyone who enters the tabulation room. Write it in your notebook. If you see vendor technicians or "contract workers" touch the tabulator at all, make a note of the time and the name of the person. In some states this is a violation of the law.

·        Ask where the modems are. (Not all counties use them.)

·        Use binoculars if needed, to observe the tabulator screen. Write any error messages down in your notebook, noting the time. If the program suddenly disappears (program crash) or the computer crashes, note the time and file a public records request for the audit log. Call incidents in to the Election Protection Hotline at +1 866 OUR-VOTE.

·        Carefully observe disk management.

·        If any pre-opened disk is put into the tabulator, ask first that the disk be brought out to demonstrate that it has nothing on it.

1.      Use a notebook to record the procedures for transferring interim vote totals to the county Web site. Do election officials recycle disks between the central tabulator and other computers? If so make a note of the time and the person doing so.

2.      Is the Web upload computer networked? If so, ask where the other networked computers are, observe who is sitting at them, write down names and employers.

·        Write down the setup of the central tabulator. Where do the cables and wires lead? Ask about this. Are multiple tabulators networked together? If so, ask where the computer is that houses the final combined program. Make sure you can see it, and make a note of who touches every tabulator on the network.

·        Watch to see if all polling places are uploaded into the central computer. Sometimes the trouble spots are held to the end, when observers are less vigilant. Sometimes they can't be uploaded at all.

[Thanks to Roxanne Jekot, Co-Founder of CountTheVote.org, Lillie Coney at the National Committee for Voting Integrity, the NAACP, and to the gang at BlackBoxVoting.org for contributions to this section.]
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