



## Electronic Voting Machine Information Sheet

### Advanced Voting Solutions WINVote

**Name / Model:** WINVote<sup>1</sup>

**Vendor:** Advanced Voting Solutions

**Voter-Verified Paper Record Capability:** None



**Brief Description:** The WINVOTE is a tablet-like touch-screen voting terminal equipped with a wireless local area network (LAN), a 15" full color screen with ZOOM capabilities, and built-in battery backup power, modem, and printer. When operational in a live election environment, the WINvote terminal rests in a plastic voting booth/secretcy and transportation case. It is designed as a stand-alone system to function both as a traditional precinct voting device and as a non-geographic voting station. This system is used in Hinds County, MS and 32 jurisdictions in VA.

**Detailed Voting Process:** After checking in at the polling place, the voter will approach one of the terminals. An election official will activate the machine. The voter will touch the "Click Here to Start" button on the welcome screen, and the ballot-marking process will begin.

The screen will display one race at a time, with available choices listed below the race name. Write-in candidates can be selected by touching the "Write-In" button at the bottom of the choice list. After making a selection, touch the "Next" button on the bottom of the screen.

When all selections have been made, the voter will be taken to a summary screen that lists that name of each race and the option that was selected by the voter. If the voter wishes to change any of these races, he/she should simply touch the name of the race and make another selection. When the voter is satisfied with the summary screen, he/she should touch the red "Next" button on the bottom-right part of the screen. The next screen has a large red "VOTE" button. After touching that button, the ballot has been cast.

### What to Look For

- **Security Seals.** Ideally, the WINVote's exposed ports, memory card access areas and case seams would be covered with tamper-evident security seals. The integrity of these seals should be maintained at all times, and only breached under controlled, explained circumstances. A voided seal looks like this:  
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/joebeone/2247733620/> . Seals should be logged to maintain chain of custody of sensitive materials.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.advancedvoting.com/index.php?p=votingequipment>



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- The Memory Card is Sensitive. Corrupt memory cards can introduce viruses, cause the main election server to crash and falsify votes. Access to the MBB memory card should be controlled, monitored and logged at all times.
- Wireless Vulnerabilities. The WINVote can be used in a wireless mode that involves individual machines talking to a controller in each precinct as well as machines and this polling place controller talking to a central election management system.<sup>2</sup> Wireless transmission of voter authentication and vote data can be very problematic and prone to error and malicious intervention. Moreover, there is evidence that the WINVote system operates over cellular frequencies (CDPD) as well as wireless data frequencies (802.11b) which considerably widens the possibilities of remote tampering.

### Past Problems

**May 2005:** *Mississippi*. Batteries failed early in the election, taking down the machines.<sup>3</sup>

**November 2003:** *Virginia*. The software failed (machines crashed throughout, voters reported difficulty in getting their choices to record), the hardware failed (some machines required new batteries, some needed to be “jiggled” back into operation, modems failed to transmit data).<sup>4</sup>

**November 2003:** *Mississippi*. Voting computers at some polling places in District 29 failed to start up. Others overheated and broke down during the election, and not enough paper ballots were available to allow all voters to vote.<sup>5</sup>

### NASED Qualification Status:<sup>6</sup>

**06/17/02:** Firmware 1.54

### References:

Votersunite.org, <http://www.votersunite.org/info/Danaherintheneews.pdf>

VerifiedVoting.org, <http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5138>

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<sup>2</sup> Eric C. Griffith. (2003, May 23). 802.11 at the Polls. Internet.com. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from [http://articles.directorym.net/802\\_11\\_at\\_the\\_Polls\\_-a882441.html](http://articles.directorym.net/802_11_at_the_Polls_-a882441.html).

<sup>3</sup> Pearl turnout reported low; problems mar voting in Jackson's Precinct 36. The Clarion-Ledger. May 3, 2005. By Cathy Hayden. <http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050503/NEWS0103/50503011>

<sup>4</sup> Operation Ballot Integrity. A Report by Fairfax County Republican Committee. January, 2004. [http://www.fairfaxco-gop.org/download/ballot\\_integrity.pdf](http://www.fairfaxco-gop.org/download/ballot_integrity.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Long lines, machine malfunctions mark today's voting. November 4, 2003; By Clay Harden. <http://www.clarionledger.com/news/0311/04/mvproblems.html>

<sup>6</sup> NASED Qualified Voting Systems (10/25/2006). National Association of State Election Directors. See: <http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDApprovedSystems1.03.pdf>