Frequently Asked Questions by Legislators

These comments, based on the text of H.R.2239/S.1980, address concerns expressed by members of the United States Congress.

I am concerned about the additional costs of implementing H.R. 2239/S.1980.

Most districts are NOT currently using touch-screen equipment. These districts can use future HAVA funds to upgrade to systems that provide a voter verifiable paper trail. If the incremental cost increase of touch screens with voter-verifiable printers is too great, ballot-printing devices with precinct-based optical scan systems can be purchased at about 1/3 of the price of touch screen systems -- and, according to many studies, these systems are at least as accurate as touch screens.

Districts currently using touch screens can upgrade by adding voter-verifiable printers. If this is too costly in the short run, such districts almost invariably have high-volume optical scan systems available for absentee voting. These paper ballots can be used in polling places as well as absentee. These systems are proven and widely used (and, of course, certified for use).

What about the voting privacy of individuals with disabilities?

H.R. 2239/S.1980 improves the situation for individuals with disabilities. It shortens the timeline for implementing machines that they can use unassisted (full privacy). The deadline would be Jan. 1 2006 under H.R.2239/S.1980, and it is not until Jan. 1, 2007 under HAVA. There are several voting systems now available that are fully accessible to the disabled and still provide a voter-verified paper trail; and there are more under development. If H.R.2239/S.1980 is enacted, and counties that use DREs have to use paper ballots in the short run, disabled individuals can still use the DREs if they choose to. So they lose nothing and possibly gain a year of private voting if H.R.2239/S.1980 is enacted.

I am concerned about the shortened timeline in H.R.2239/S.1980.

Every district can meet the deadlines. If new equipment is not ready by November 2004, counties can continue to use paper-based systems, and disabled voters can still choose to vote on paperless, accessible systems if they would have been available otherwise. Note that most counties have absentee voting systems based on paper ballots.

I am concerned about states' rights.

It is within the province of the federal government to regulate the voting methods for federal elections, such as the Presidential election. H.R.2239/S.1980 does not mandate more regulation of the states than HAVA does; it simply mandates somewhat different regulation.

The requirement for a paper receipt opens the door to fraud.

There are no "receipts." H.R. 2239/S.1980 mandates paper records that are left in a secure container in the polling place, like conventional paper ballots. The voters cannot take a copy of their votes away from the polling place. These records would enable MEANINGFUL recounts, rather than simple repetition of the machine tallies.

I want to see what the Election Assistance Commission recommends.

As of March, 2004, the Election Assistance Commission was still not fully funded or operational, even though HAVA mandated it to be established and working by February of 2003. The states have been left without any federal guidance in their efforts to comply with HAVA and safeguard our votes. H.R.2239/S.1980 fills that vacuum by providing standards that are supported by millions of Americans, thousands of computer science experts, many state legislators and election officials, and over 125 members of the House and Senate.

I thought HAVA already required a voter-verifiable paper ballot.

HAVA Section 301 (a)(2)(B) says:

(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system.

(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to change the ballot or correct any error before the permanent paper record is produced.

(iii) The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is used.

On first reading, this requirement seems to ensure that every voter can verify a paper record of his or her vote and that the verified records will be available for a manual recount. Some legislators seem to have intended this meaning and therefore thought that it was a HAVA requirement. In fact, Senator John Ensign (R-NV), who introduced this language into the bill, says that was the precise intent. Unfortunately, this audit requirement is widely interpreted to mean the permanent record produced at the end-of-day, unverified by voters.