This document provides a comparison of the provisions of each of three currently-pending Senate bills:

• S. 1980, The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003
• S. 1986, The Protecting American Democracy Act of 2003
• S. 2045, The Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting Act of 2004

Senate Bill 1980

• The voting system must provide a voter-verified paper record
• The voter-verified record will be the official record used in any recount
• The EAC will conduct mandatory manual surprise recounts in 0.5% of the jurisdictions
  
• Voting system software must be disclosed to the EAC and made available, on request, to citizens
  
• Wireless communications devices are prohibited from being used in voting systems
• All voting system hardware and software must be certified by labs accredited by the EAC
  
• Jurisdictions must comply with these requirements in time for the November 2004 election
• Interim paper ballot (e.g., mail-in ballot) systems can be used to achieve compliance

These bills also make some adjustments to HAVA funding deadlines to allow jurisdictions more time to apply for funds to upgrade their voting systems. However, the Holt bill was written on the assumption that it would be passed prior to November 2003.  As a result, it contains some revised deadlines that are now in the past. Presumably, these will be adjusted when the bill is marked up in the House Administration Committee, where it is currently pending. Similar adjustments of these funding deadlines will be required for S. 1980, and these will likely occur when that bill is marked up in the Senate Rules Committee. A more detailed description of all of the specific provisions of these bills can be found in the table below.

Senate Bill 1986

S. 1986 was introduced by Senator Clinton of New York in December 2003.  It would establish the following requirements for voting systems used in federal elections:

• Voting systems must ensure "the security of the votes as verified", either by employing:
  
  • Voter-verifiable paper ballots, or
    
  • Purely electronic (i.e., paperless) methods of verification (e.g., votemeters, encrypted votes)
    
• Wireless communications devices are prohibited from being used in voting systems
• All voting system hardware and software must be certified by labs accredited by the EAC
  
• Voting systems must adhere to Federal computer systems security requirements
• Requires EAC, NIST, and the GAO to issue reports and develop security procedures
• Authorizes $2,000,000 in FY 2004-2006 for NIST to provide security consultation services
  

Unfortunately, the language of S. 1986 that pertains to voter verification (Section 2(a)(C)) is vague, ambiguous, and inconsistent in its terminology.  In addition, this bill is considerably shorter than either S. 1980 or S. 2045, and consequently contains significantly fewer provisions than either of those two Senate bills.  As can be seen from the list above and the table below, S. 1986 is considerably weaker than these other two bills with respect to its provisions for a voter-verified audit capacity.  In particular:

• It does not establish a voter-verified audit capacity in time for the November 2004 election
• It does not require that a voter-verified record be the official record used in any recount or audit
  
• It does not require such records to actually be used in any audit, only that they be available for use
  
• It does not require any mandatory manual surprise recounts
• It does not mandate a proven technology (e.g., paper) for providing a voter-verified audit capacity
• It does not define the process by which electronic verification methods would be approved

Senate Bill 2045

S. 2045, introduced by Senator Boxer of California in February 2004, is very similar to S. 1980; it contains many of the same provisions, but it deletes some and adds others.  It differs from S. 1980 in the following ways:

• Adds a number of new security requirements that must be met by November 2004:
• Some of these requirements can rapidly be put in place:
• Requires documented chain of custody for all voting system software
• Forbids transfer of voting system software over the Internet
• Requires voting system software to be re-certified if altered
• Others cannot realistically be implemented by November 2004:
• Bans the use of thermal paper, which most DRE printers now use
• Requires backgrounds checks for programmers who write voting system software
• Requires manufacturers to implement unspecified NIST security procedures
• Requires manufacturers to implement unspecified NIST requirements
• Extends the expired funding deadlines derived from H.R. 2239 so these are now in the future
  
• Authorizes additional EAC funding (amount unspecified) to States for the costs of implementing a voter-verified paper audit capacity
• Deletes several provisions included in S. 1980, including:
  • The right of citizens to appeal to the EAC unfair local treatment of recount results
  • The right of disabled voters to use accessible DREs rather than an interim paper voting system
  • The requirement that purely-electronic voter-verification mechanisms for use by the disabled must separate the function of vote generation and vote casting
    

But of even greater concern is the difficulty of implementing by November 2004 many of the well-intended provisions of S. 2045. While a voter-verified audit capacity can be put in place in time for November 2004 (either by installing printers on DREs to produce a voter-verified paper record or by using an interim paper ballot system), many of the other provisions of S. 2045 cannot. Those provisions should be handled separately in the context of a more realistic deadline (e.g, 2006).

Tabular comparison of specific provisions

In the table below, each specific provision is listed on a separate row, while the specific implementation of that provision by each of the three bills is indicated in the columns of that row. The relevant section of each bill is listed in italic type.

Senate Bill	S.1980 (Graham)	S.1986 (Clinton)	S.2045 (Boxer)
Requires a voter-verified paper record	YES Sect. 4(a)(2)(B)(i)	NO: requires a voter-verified record, but allows either a paper record or an electronic method, such as a modular voting architecture, encrypted votes, or a votemeter.* Sect. 2(a)(C)(iv)(I)	YES: but bans use of thermal paper for the paper record Sect. 2(a)(2)(B)(i)
Voter-verified paper record shall be equivalent or superior to that of a paper ballot system	YES Sect. 4(a)(2)(A)	NO	YES Sect. 2(a)(2)(A)
Requires manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records in 0.5% of jurisdictions.	YES: includes provision for citizen appeal Sect. 7	NO	YES: No provision for citizen appeal Sect. 6
Requires the voter-verified record to be the official record used for any recount	YES Sect. 4(a)(2)(B)(iii)	NO: only requires the verified vote to be available as an official record Sect. 2(a)(C)(iii)	YES Sect. 2(a)(2)(B)(iii)
Requires public disclosure of voting system software	YES Sect. 4(a)(2)(C)(i)	NO	YES Sect. 2(a)(2)(C)(i)
Change in audit trail compliance deadline from November 2006 to November 2004	YES Sect. 5(a)	NO	YES Sect. 4(a)
Requirement to deploy an interim paper system for November 2004 if HAVA waiver was requested	YES Sect. 2(d)	NO	YES Sect. 3(d)
Requires use of interim paper ballot voting system for 2004, at EAC expense, if VVPR printers not available in time.	YES Jurisdictions shall receive a paper voting system at EAC expense. Sect. 5(b)	NO	YES If jurisdiction certifies by July 1, 2004 that it is unable to obtain VVPR printers, then EAC shall reimburse the jurisdictions for any costs incurred in using interim paper ballot voting system. Sect. 4(b,e)
The mechanism to provide voter-verification of results for disabled voters must not require the use of paper	YES Sect. 4(b)(2)	N/A	YES Sect. 2(b)(2)
If an interim paper ballot voting system is used, then disabled voters shall have the option of:	using that paper system with the assistance of an aide of their choosing or using the accessible voting system otherwise put in place (under HAVA) for use by disabled voters Sect. 4(b)(3)	N/A	using that paper system with the assistance of an aide of their choosing or using the voting system otherwise put in place (under HAVA) for use by any voters (i.e., not specifically an accessible voting system) Sect. 2(b)(3)
Requires EAC to study, test, and develop best practices to enhance accessibility and voter-verification methods for disabled voters.	YES Sect. 4(c)	NO	YES Sect. 2(d)
Requires federal certification of technological security of voter registration lists	YES Sect. 6	NO	YES Sect. 5
Bans wireless communication in voting systems	YES Sect. 4(a)(2)(C)(ii)	YES Sect. 3(a)(7)(A)	YES Sect. 2(a)(2)(C)(ii)
All voting machine hardware and software to be certified by EAC-accredited labs	YES Sect. 4(a)(2)(C)(iii)	YES Sect. 3(a)(7)(A)	YES Sect. 2(a)(2)(C)(iii)
Repeals exemption of EAC from certain government contracting requirements	YES Sect. 3	NO	YES Sect. 8
Extends time provided for states to request payments under HAVA Title 1	YES: Extends deadlines for  HAVA Sect. 101(a) and 102(b)(1) to November 2003 Sect. 2(a) and (b)	NO	YES: Extends deadlines for HAVA Sect. 101(a) and 102(b)(1) to November 2004 Sect. 3(a) and (b)
Extends period of appropriations under HAVA Sect. 104(a)	YES: Extends to FY 2003 and 2004 Sect. 2(c)(1)	NO	YES: Extends to FY 2003 through 2005 Sect. 3(c)(1)
Extends time for transfer to EAC of unobligated funds under HAVA Sect. 104(c)(2)(B)	YES: Changes date from Sept. 1, 2003 to January 1, 2004 Sect. 2(c)(2)	NO	YES: Changes date from Sept. 1, 2003 to January 1, 2005 Sect. 3(c)(2)
Move the deadline in HAVA Sect. 301(a)(3)(C) from January 1, 2007 to January 1, 2006	YES Sect. 4(b)(3)	NO	YES Sect. 2(b)(3)
Voter-verification and audit capacity funding	NO	NO	YES: EAC shall assist each State in paying the costs of implementing a voter-verified audit capacity, but such payments will not exceed the average cost of adding a printer to each voting system Part 7, Sec. 271
Background checks for programmers and developers of voting system software	NO	NO	YES: (By November 2004) Sect. 7(a)(7)(B)(i)
Documented chain of custody for all voting system software	NO	NO	YES: (By November 2004) Sect. 7(a)(7)(B)(ii)
Forbids transfer of voting system software over the Internet	NO	NO	YES: (By November 2004) Sect. 7(a)(7)(B)(iii)
Voting system software must be recertified if altered	NO	NO	YES: (By November 2004) Sect. 7(a)(7)(B)(iv)
Vendor shall implement internal security procedures as required by the Director of NIST	NO	NO	YES: (By November 2004) Sect. 7(a)(7)(B)(v)
Vendor shall meet any other requirements established by the Director of NIST	NO	NO	YES: (By November 2004) Sect. 7(a)(7)(B)(vi)
Voting system shall adhere to security requirements for Federal computer systems or more stringent requirements adopted by the EAC	NO	YES Sect. 3(a)(7)(A)	NO
The EAC & NIST shall report to Congress within 6 months of passage regarding a proposed security review and certification process for all voting systems	NO	YES Sect. 3(a)(7)(B)	NO
Within 3 months of passage, the GAO shall issue a report on systems to safeguard the security of voting systems and an implementation schedule.	NO	YES Sect. 3(a)(7)(C)	NO
NIST shall provide security consultation services to jurisdictions and $2,000,000 is authorized for this purpose for each fiscal year 2004 through 2006	NO	YES Sect. 3(a)(7)(D)	NO

*For definitions of the terms: modular voting architecture, encrypted votes, and votemeter, please see pages 29 through 31 of the report of the Congressional Research Service entitled
  "Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues", by Eric A. Fisher.

This "Comparison of Senate Bills 1980, 1986, and 2045" was prepared on February 17, 2004 by Bob Kibrick, legislative analyst for VerifiedVoting.org  ( bob@verifiedvoting.org - http://www.verifiedvoting.org ).