# Volume I, Section 6

## Security

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6.1 Scope

This section describes essential security capabilities for a voting system, encompassing the system’s hardware, software, communications, and documentation. The Guidelines recognize that no predefined set of security standards will address and defeat all conceivable or theoretical threats. However, the Guidelines articulate requirements to achieve acceptable levels of integrity, reliability, and inviolability. Ultimately, the objectives of the security standards for voting systems are:

♦ To establish and maintain controls that can ensure that accidents, inadvertent mistakes, and errors are minimized,
♦ To protect the system from intentional manipulation and fraud, and from malicious mischief,
♦ To identify fraudulent or erroneous changes to the system, and
♦ To protect secrecy in the voting process.

The Guidelines are intended to address a broad range of risks to the integrity of a voting system. While it is not possible to identify all potential risks, the Guidelines identify several types of risk that must be addressed by a voting system. These include:

♦ Unauthorized changes to system capabilities for:
  • Defining ballot formats,
  • Casting and recording votes,
  • Calculating vote totals consistent with defined ballot formats, and
  • Reporting vote totals,
♦ Alteration of voting system audit trails,
♦ Changing, or preventing the recording of, a vote,
♦ Introducing data for a vote not cast by a registered voter,
♦ Changing calculated vote totals,
♦ Preventing access to vote data, including individual votes and vote totals, to unauthorized individuals, and
♦ Preventing access to voter identification data and data for votes cast by the voter such that an individual can determine the content of specific votes cast by the voter.

This section describes specific capabilities that vendors shall integrate into a voting system in order to address the risks listed above. Three have been added:

♦ Security requirements for software distribution and for verifying that voting systems are operating with the correct software configuration (Subsection 6.4.5)
• Security requirements for the use of wireless networking in voting systems (Subsection 6.4.4)
• Security requirements for voter verified paper audit trails (Subsection 6.8). This subsection is optional and has been included to provide national testing guidelines for use by those states that have elected to include this feature for their electronic voting systems.

6.1.1 System Components and Sources

The requirements of this section apply to the broad range of hardware, software, communications components, and documentation that comprises a voting system. These requirements apply to components:
♦ Provided by the voting system vendor and the vendor’s suppliers,
♦ Furnished by an external provider (for example providers of personal computers and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) operating systems) where the components are capable of being used during voting system operation, and
♦ Developed by a voting jurisdiction.

6.1.2 Location and Control of Software and Hardware on Which it Operates

The requirements of this section apply to all software used in any manner to support any voting-related activity, regardless of the ownership of the software or the ownership and location of the hardware on which the software is installed or operated. These requirements apply to software that operates on:
♦ Voting devices and vote counting devices installed at polling places under the control or authority of the voting jurisdiction, and
♦ Ballot printers, vote counting devices, and other hardware typically installed at central or precinct locations (including contractor facilities).

However, some requirements are applicable only in circumstances specified by this section.

6.1.3 Elements of Security Outside Vendor Control

The requirements of this section apply to the capabilities of a voting system provided by the vendor. The Guidelines recognizes that effective security requires safeguards beyond those provided by the vendor. Effective security demands diligent security practices by the purchasing jurisdiction and the jurisdictions representatives. These practices include:
♦ Administrative and management controls for the voting system and election management, including access controls,
♦ Internal security procedures,
♦ Adherence to, and enforcement of, operational procedures (e.g., effective password management),
♦ Security of physical facilities, and
♦ Organizational responsibilities and personnel screening.

Because specific standards for these elements are not under the direct control of the vendor, they will be addressed in forthcoming Election Management Best Practices that address best practices for jurisdictions conducting elections and managing the operation of voting systems.

6.1.4 Organization of this Section

The guidelines presented in this section are organized as follows:
♦ Access Control: These standards addresses procedures and system capabilities that limit or detect access to critical system components in order to guard against loss of system integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability.

♦ Equipment and Data Security: These standards address physical security measures and procedures that prevent disruption of the voting process at the poll site and corruption of voting data.

♦ Software Security: These standards address the installation of software, including firmware, in the voting system and the protection against malicious software. It should be noted that computer-generated audit controls facilitate system security and are an integral part of software capability. These audit requirements are presented in Section 4.4.

♦ Telecommunication and Data Transmission: These standards address security for the electronic transmission of data between system components or locations over private, public and wireless networks

♦ Security for Transmission of Official Data Over Public Communications Networks: These standards address security for systems that communicate individual votes or vote totals over public communications networks.

♦ Security Requirements for Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (optional): This capability is not mandatory. These guidelines are included for use by those states that have elected to include this feature for their electronic voting systems.
6.2 Access Control

Access controls are procedures and system capabilities that detect or limit access to system components in order to guard against loss of system integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability. Access controls provide reasonable assurance that system resources such as data files, application programs, and computer-related facilities and equipment are protected against unauthorized operation, modification, disclosure, loss, or impairment. Unauthorized operations include modification of compiled or interpreted code, run-time alteration of flow control logic or of data, and abstraction of raw or processed voting data in any form other than a standard output report by an authorized operator.

Access controls may include physical controls, such as keeping computers in locked rooms to limit physical access, and technical controls, such as security software programs designed to prevent or detect unauthorized access to sensitive files. The access controls contained in this section are limited to those controls required of system vendors. Access Control Policy

The vendor shall specify the general features and capabilities of the access control policy recommended to provide effective voting system security.

6.2.1 General Access Control Policy

Although the jurisdiction in which the voting system is operated is responsible for determining the access policies for each election, the vendor shall provide a description of recommended policies for:

a. Software access controls,
b. Hardware access controls,
c. Communications,
d. Effective password management,
e. Protection abilities of a particular operating system,
f. General characteristics of supervisory access privileges,
g. Segregation of duties, and
h. Any additional relevant characteristics.

6.2.2 Individual Access Privileges

Voting system vendors shall:

a. Identify each person to whom access is granted, and the specific functions and data to which each person holds authorized access,
b. Specify whether an individual’s authorization is limited to a specific time, time interval, or phase of the voting or counting operations, and
c. Permit the voter to cast a ballot expeditiously, but preclude voter access to all other aspects of the vote-counting processes.

6.2.3 Access Control Measures

Vendors shall provide a detailed description of all system access control measures designed to permit authorized access to the system and prevent unauthorized access. Examples of such measures include:

a. Use of data and user authorization,
b. Program unit ownership and other regional boundaries,
c. One-end or two-end port protection devices,
d. Security kernels,
e. Computer-generated password keys,
f. Special protocols,
g. Message encryption, and
h. Controlled access security.

Vendors also shall define and provide a detailed description of the methods used to prevent unauthorized access to the access control capabilities of the system itself.

6.3 Physical Security Measures

A voting system’s sensitivity to disruption or corruption of data depends, in part, on the physical location of equipment and data media, and on the establishment of secure telecommunications among various locations. Most often, the disruption of voting and vote counting results from a physical violation of one or more areas of the system thought to be protected. Therefore, security procedures shall address physical threats and the corresponding means to defeat them.

6.3.1 Polling Place Security

For polling place operations, vendors shall develop and provide detailed documentation of measures to anticipate and counteract vandalism, civil disobedience, and similar occurrences. The measures shall:
a. Allow the immediate detection of tampering with vote casting devices and precinct ballot counters, and
b. Control physical access to a telecommunications link if such a link is used.

### 6.3.2 Central Count Location Security

Vendors shall develop and document in detail the measures to be taken in a central counting environment. These measures shall include physical and procedural controls related to the:

a. Handling of ballot boxes,
b. Preparing of ballots for counting,
c. Counting operations, and
d. Reporting data.

### 6.4 Software Security

Voting systems shall meet specific security requirements for the installation of software and for protection against malicious software.

#### 6.4.1 Software and Firmware Installation

The system shall meet the following requirements for installation of software, including hardware with embedded firmware:

a. If software is resident in the system as firmware, the vendor shall require and state in the system documentation that every device is to be retested to validate each ROM prior to the start of elections operations,
b. To prevent alteration of executable code, no software shall be permanently installed or resident in the system unless the system documentation states that the jurisdiction must provide a secure physical and procedural environment for the storage, handling, preparation, and transportation of the system hardware,
c. The system bootstrap, monitor, and device-controller software may be resident permanently as firmware, provided that this firmware has been shown to be inaccessible to activation or control by any means other than by the authorized initiation and execution of the vote-counting program, and its associated exception handlers,
d. The election-specific programming may be installed and resident as firmware, provided that such firmware is installed on a component (such as computer chip) other than the component on which the operating system resides; and

e. After initiation of election day testing, no source code or compilers or assemblers shall be resident or accessible.

### 6.4.2 Protection Against Malicious Software

Voting systems shall deploy protection against the many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Vendors shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status.

### 6.4.3 Distribution of Voting System Software and Setup Validation

This section specifies requirements for the distribution of voting system software and the setup validation performed on voting system equipment. These requirements are applicable to voting systems that have completed certification testing. The goal of the software distribution requirements is to ensure that the correct voting system software has been distributed without modification. The goal of setup validation requirements, including requirements for verifying the presence of certified software and the absence of other software, is to ensure that voting system equipment is in a proper initial state before being used.

In general, a voting system can be considered to be composed of multiple other systems including polling place systems, central counting/aggregation systems, and election management systems. These other systems may reside on different computer platforms at different locations and run different software. Voting system software is considered to be all executable code and associated configuration files critical for the proper operation of the voting system regardless of the location of installation and functionality provided. This includes third party software such as operating systems, drivers, etc.
6.4.4 Software Distribution Methodology Requirements

6.4.1.1 The vendor shall document all software including voting system software, third party software (such as operating systems, drivers, etc.) to be installed on voting equipment of the certified voting system, and installation programs.

Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

6.4.4.1 The documentation shall have a unique identifier (such as a serial number) for the following set of information: documentation, software vendor name, product name, version, certification number of the voting system, file names and paths or other location information (such as storage addresses) of the software.

Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

6.4.4.2 The documentation shall designate all software files as static, semi-static, or dynamic.

Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

Discussion: Static voting system software such as executable code does not change based on the election being conducted or the voting equipment upon which it is installed. Semi-static voting system software contains configuration information for the voting system based on the voting equipment that is installed and the election being conducted. Semi-static software is only modified during the installation of (a) the voting system software on voting equipment or (b) the election specific software such as ballot formats. Dynamic voting system software changes over time once installed on voting equipment. However, the specific time or value of the change in the dynamic software is usually unknown a priori.
making it impossible to create reference information to verify the software.

6.4.3 The EAC accredited testing authority shall witness the final build of the executable version of the certified voting system software performed by the vendor.

Testing Authority

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

6.4.4 The testing authority shall create a complete record of the build that includes: a unique identifier (such as a serial number) for the complete record; list of unique identifiers of write-once media associated with the record; time, date, location, name and signatures of all people present; source code and resulting executable file names; version of voting system software; certification number of the voting system; the name and versions of all (including third party) libraries; and the name, version, and configuration files of the development environment used for the build.

Testing Authority

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

6.4.5 The record of the source code and executable files shall be made on write-once media. Each piece of write-once media shall have a unique identifier.

Testing Authority

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

Discussion: Write-once media includes technology such as a CD-R, ROM, or PROM (but not EEPROM or CD-RW). The unique identifiers appear on indelibly printed labels and in a digitally signed file on the write-once media.
6.4.6 The testing authority shall retain this record until the voting system
ceases to be nationally certified.

Testing Authority

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6.4.7 The EAC accredited testing authority shall create a subset of the
complete record of the build that includes a unique identifier (such as
a serial number) of the subset, the unique identifier of the complete
record, list of unique identifiers of write-once media associated with
the subset, vendor, product name, version of voting system software,
certification number of the voting system, all the files that resulted
from the build and binary images of all installation programs.

Testing Authority

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6.4.8 The record of the software shall be made on write-once media. Each
piece of write-once media shall have a unique identifier.

Testing Authority

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6.4.9 The testing authority shall retain a copy, send a copy to the vendor,
and send a copy to the NIST National Software Reference Library
(NSRL)\(^1\) and/or to any other repository named by the Election
Assistance Commission.

Testing Authority

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\(^1\) The National Software Reference Library (NSRL) is a repository of software established and directed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. It was designed to meet the need for court admissible evidence in the identification of software files. The EAC designated the NSRL as a repository for voting system software. Information is available at www.nsrl.nist.gov.
6.4.4.10 The testing authority shall retain this record until the voting system ceases to be nationally certified.

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6.4.4.11 The vendor shall provide the NSRL or other EAC designated repository with a copy of all third party software.

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6.4.4.12 All voting system software, installation programs, third party software (such as operating systems, drivers, etc.) used to install or to be installed on voting system equipment shall be distributed on a write-once media.

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6.4.4.13 The vendor shall document that the process used to verify the software distributed on write-once media is the certified software by using the reference information provided by the NSRL or other EAC designated repository.

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6.4.4.14 The voting system equipment shall be designed to allow the voting system administrator to verify that the software is the certified software by comparing it to reference information produced by the NSRL or other EAC designated repository before installing the software.

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6.4.4.15 The vendors and testing authority shall document to whom they provide voting system software write-once media.

V Voting System Vendor  T Testing Authority

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.4.5 Generation and Distribution Requirements for Reference Information

6.4.5.1 The NSRL or other EAC designed repository shall generate reference information using the binary images of the (a) certified voting system software received on write-once media from testing authorities and (b) election specific software received on write-once media from jurisdictions.

R Repository

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.4.5.2 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository shall generate reference information in at least one of the following forms: (a) complete binary images, (b) cryptographic hash values, or (c) digital signatures of the software.

R Repository

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

Discussion: Although binary images, cryptographic hashes, and digital signatures can detect a modification or alteration in the software, they cannot determine if the change to the software was accidental or intentional.

6.4.5.3 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository shall create a record of the creation of reference information that includes: a unique identifier (such as a serial number) for the record, file names of software and associated unique identifier(s) of the write-once media from which reference information is generated, time, date, name of people who generated reference information, the type of reference information created, certification number of voting system (if issued), voting system software version, product name, and vendor.
6.4.5.4 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository shall retain the write-once media used to generate the reference information until the voting system ceases to be nationally certified.

6.4.5.5 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository that generates hash value and/or digital signature reference information shall use FIPS approved algorithms for hashing and signing.

6.4.5.5.1 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository that generates hash values, digital signatures reference information, or cryptographic keys shall use a FIPS 140-2 level 1 or higher validated cryptographic module.


6.4.5.5.2 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository that generates sets of hash values and digital signatures for reference information shall include a hash value or digital signature covering the set of reference information.
6.4.5.5.3 If the NSRL or other EAC designated repository uses public key technology, the following requirements shall be met:

• public and private key pairs used by the repository to generate digital signatures shall be 2048-bits or greater in length, and

• the repository’s private keys used to generate digital signature reference information shall be used for no more than three years.

6.4.5.5.4 Public keys used to verify digital signature reference information shall be placed on a write-once media if not contained in a signed non-proprietary format for distribution.

Discussion: Examples of non-proprietary standard formats include X.509 or PKCS#7.

6.4.5.5.5 All copies of public key write-once media made by the repository shall be labeled so that they are uniquely identifiable including at a minimum: a unique identifier (such as a serial number) for the write-once media, time, date, location, name(s) of the repository owning the associated private keys, documentation about its creation, and an indication that the contents are public keys.
6.4.5.5.6 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository shall
document to whom they provide write-once media containing
their public keys used to verify digital signature reference
information including at a minimum: the uniquely identified
public keys, time and date provided, name and contact
information (phone, address, email address, etc.) of the
recipient.

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6.4.5.5.7 When a private key used to generate digital signature
reference information becomes compromised, the NSRL or
other EAC designated repository shall provide notification to
recipients of the associated public key that the private key
has been compromised and the date of compromise.

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6.4.5.5.8 The NSRL or other EAC designated repository shall
make both the reference information available on write-once
media and its associated documentation that is labeled by the
repository that created it uniquely identifiable by including at
a minimum: a unique identifier (such as a serial number) for
the write-once media, time, date, location, name of the
creating repository, and an indication that the contents are
reference information.

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6.4.6 Setup Validation Methodology Requirements

6.4.6.1 Setup validation methods shall verify that no unauthorized software
is present on the voting equipment.

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6.4.6.2 The vendor shall have a process to verify that the correct software is loaded, that there is no unauthorized software, and that static and semi-static voting system software on voting equipment has not been modified using the reference information from the NSRL or other EAC designated repository.

6.4.6.2.1 The process used to verify software should be possible to perform without using software installed on the voting system.

6.4.6.2.2 The vendor shall document the process used to verify software on voting equipment.

6.4.6.2.3 The process shall not modify the voting system software on the voting system during the verification process.

6.4.6.3 The vendor shall provide a method to comprehensively list all software files that are installed on voting systems.
6.4.6.3.1 The verification process shall be able to be performed using COTS software and hardware available from sources other than the voting system vendor.

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6.4.6.3.2 If the process uses hashes or digital signatures, then the verification software shall use a FIPS 140-2 level 1 or higher validated cryptographic module.

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6.4.6.3.3 The verification process shall either (a) use reference information on “write-once” media received from the repository or (b) verify the digital signature of the reference information on any other media.

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6.4.6.3.4 Voting system equipment shall provide a read-only external interface to access the software on the system.
- The external interface shall be protected using tamper evident techniques.
- The external interface shall have a physical indicator showing when the interface is enabled and disabled.
- The external interface shall be disabled during voting.
- The external interface should provide a direct read-only access to the location of the voting system software without the use of installed software.

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6.4.6.4 Setup validation methods shall verify that registers and variables of the voting system equipment contain the proper static and initial values.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.4.6.5 The vendor should provide a method to query the voting systems to determine the values of all static and dynamic registers and variables including the values that jurisdictions are required to modify to conduct a specific election.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.4.6.6 The vendor shall document the values of all static registers and variables and the initial starting values of all dynamic registers and variables listed for voting system software except for the values set to conduct a specific election.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.5 Telecommunications and Data Transmission

There are four areas that must be addressed by telecommunications and data transmission security capabilities:

♦ Access control for telecommunications capabilities,

♦ Data integrity,

♦ Detection and prevention of data interception, and

♦ Protection against external threats to which commercial products used by a voting system may be susceptible.
6.5.1 Access Control

Voting systems that use telecommunications to communicate between system components and locations are subject to the same security requirements governing access to any other system hardware, software, and data function.

6.5.2 Data Integrity

Voting systems that use electrical or optical transmission of data shall ensure the receipt of valid vote records is verified at the receiving station. This should include standard transmission error detection and correction methods such as checksums or message digest hashes. Verification of correct transmission shall occur at the voting system application level and ensure that the correct data is recorded on all relevant components consolidated within the polling place prior to the voter completing casting of his or her ballot.

6.5.3 Data Interception Prevention

Voting systems that use telecommunications as defined in Section 5 to communicate between system components and locations before the poll site is officially closed shall:

a. Implement an encryption standard currently documented and validated for use by an agency of the U.S. Federal Government; and

b. Provide a means to detect the presence of an intrusive process, such as an Intrusion Detection System.

6.5.4 Protection Against External Threats

Voting systems that use public telecommunications networks shall implement protections against external threats to which commercial products used in the system may be susceptible.

6.5.4.1 Identification of COTS Products

Voting systems that use public telecommunications networks shall provide system documentation that clearly identifies all COTS hardware and software products and communications services used in the development and/or operation of the voting system, including:

a. Operating systems,

b. Communications routers,
c. Modem drivers, and  

d. Dial-up networking software.

Such documentation shall identify the name, vendor, and version used for each such component.

6.5.4.2 Use of Protective Software  
Voting systems that use public telecommunications networks shall use protective software at the receiving-end of all communications paths to:

a. Detect the presence of a threat in a transmission,  
b. Remove the threat from infected files/data,  
c. Prevent against storage of the threat anywhere on the receiving device,  
d. Provide the capability to confirm that no threats are stored in system memory and in connected storage media, and  
e. Provide data to the system audit log indicating the detection of a threat and the processing performed.

Vendors shall use multiple forms of protective software as needed to provide capabilities for the full range of products used by the voting system.

6.5.4.3 Monitoring and Responding to External Threats  
Voting systems that use public telecommunications networks may become vulnerable, by virtue of their system components, to external threats to the accuracy and integrity of vote recording, vote counting, and vote consolidation and reporting processes. Therefore, vendors of such systems shall document how they plan to monitor and respond to known threats to which their voting systems are vulnerable. This documentation shall provide a detailed description, including scheduling information, of the procedures the vendor will use to:

a. Monitor threats, such as through the review of assessments, advisories, and alerts for COTS components issued by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), for which a current listing can be found at http://www.cert.org, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), for which a current listing can be found at http://www.nipc.gov/warnings/warnings.htm, and the Federal Computer Incident Response Capability (FedCIRC), for which additional information can be found at http://www.fedcirc.gov/,  
b. Evaluate the threats and, if any, proposed responses,  
c. Develop responsive updates to the system and/or corrective procedures,  
d. Submit the proposed response to the test labs and appropriate states for approval, identifying the exact changes and whether or not they are temporary or permanent,
e. After implementation of the proposed response is approved by the state, assist clients, either directly or through detailed written procedures, how to update their systems and/or to implement the corrective procedures no later than one month before an election, and

f. Address threats emerging too late to correct the system at least one month before the election, including:

1) Providing prompt, emergency notification to the test labs and the affected states and user jurisdictions,

2) Assisting client jurisdictions directly, or advising them through detailed written procedures, to disable the public telecommunications mode of the system, and

3) After the election, modifying the system to address the threat, submitting the modified system to a test lab and the EAC or state certification authority for approval, and assisting client jurisdictions directly, or advising them through detailed written procedures, to update their systems and/or to implement the corrective procedures after approval.

6.5.5 Shared Operating Environment

Ballot recording and vote counting can be performed in either a dedicated or non-dedicated environment. If ballot recording and vote counting operations are performed in an environment that is shared with other data processing functions, both hardware and software features shall be present to protect the integrity of vote counting and of vote data. Systems that use a shared operating environment shall:

a. Use security procedures and logging records to control access to system functions,

b. Partition or compartmentalize voting system functions from other concurrent functions at least logically, and preferably physically as well,

c. Control system access by means of passwords, and restriction of account access to necessary functions only, and

d. Have capabilities in place to control the flow of information, precluding data leakage through shared system resources.

6.5.6 Access to Incomplete Election Returns and Interactive Queries

If the voting system provides access to incomplete election returns and interactive inquiries before the completion of the official count, the system shall:

a. For equipment that operates in a central counting environment, be designed to provide external access to incomplete election returns only if that access for these purposes is authorized by the statutes and regulations of the using agency. This requirement applies as well to polling place
equipment that contains a removable memory module, or that may be removed in its entirety to a
central place for the consolidation of polling place returns.

b. Use voting system software and its security environment designed such that data accessible to
interactive queries resides in an external file, or database, that is created and maintained by the
elections software under the restrictions applying to any other output report, namely, that:
1) The output file or database has no provision for write-access back to the system.
2) Persons whose only authorized access is to the file or database are denied write-
access, both to the file or database, and to the system.

6.6 Security for Transmission of Official Data Over Public
Communications Networks

DRE systems that transmit data over public telecommunications networks face security risks that
are not present in other DRE systems. This section describes standards applicable to DRE
systems that use public telecommunications networks.

6.6.1 General Security Requirements for Systems Transmitting Data Over Public
Networks

All systems that transmit data over public telecommunications networks shall:
a. Preserve the secrecy of a voter’s ballot choices, and prevent anyone from violating ballot privacy,
b. Employ digital signatures for all communications between the vote server and other devices that
communicate with the server over the network, and
c. Require that at least two authorized election officials activate any critical operation regarding the
processing of ballots transmitted over a public communications network, i.e. the passwords or
cryptographic keys of at least two employees are required to perform processing of votes.

6.6.2 Voting Process Security for Casting Individual Ballots over a Public
Telecommunications Network

Systems designed for transmission of telecommunications over public networks shall meet
security standards that address the security risks attendant with the casting of ballots from poll
sites controlled by election officials using voting devices configured and installed by election
officials and/or their vendor or contractor, and using in-person authentication of individual
voters.
6.6.2.1 Documentation of Mandatory Security Activities

Vendors of systems that cast individual ballots over a public telecommunications network shall provide detailed descriptions of:

a. All activities mandatory to ensuring effective system security to be performed in setting up the system for operation, including testing of security before an election; and

b. All activities that should be prohibited during system setup and during the timeframe for voting operations, including both the hours when polls are open and when polls are closed.

6.6.2.2 Capabilities to Operate During Interruption of Telecommunications Capabilities

These systems shall provide the following capabilities to provide resistance to interruptions of telecommunications service that prevent voting devices at the poll site from communicating with external components via telecommunications:

a. Detect the occurrence of a telecommunications interruption at the poll site and switch to an alternative mode of operation that is not dependent on the connection between poll site voting devices and external system components,

b. Provide an alternate mode of operation that includes the functionality of a conventional DRE machine without losing any single vote,

c. Create and preserve an audit trail of every vote cast during the period of interrupted communication and system operation in conventional DRE system mode,

d. Upon reestablishment of communications, transmit and process votes accumulated while operating in conventional DRE system mode with all security safeguards in effect, and

e. Ensure that all safeguards related to voter identification and authentication are not affected by the procedures employed by the system to counteract potential interruptions of telecommunications capabilities.

6.7 Wireless Requirements

This section provides wireless requirements for implementing and using wireless capabilities within a voting system. These requirements reduce, but don’t eliminate, the risk of using wireless communications for voting systems.

Wireless is defined as any means of communication that occurs without wires. This normally covers the entire electromagnetic spectrum. For the purposes of this section wireless includes radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR), and microwave.

Since the wireless communications path on which the signals travel is via the air and not via a wire or cable, devices other than those intended to receive the wireless signal (e.g., voting data) can receive (intentionally and unintentionally) the wireless signals. Some of the wireless communications paths (i.e., signals) are weakened by walls and distance, but are not stopped.
This makes it possible to eavesdrop from a distance as well as transmit wireless signals (e.g., interference or intrusive data) from a distance. In many cases the wireless signals cannot be seen, heard, or felt, thus making the presence of wireless communication hard to determine by the human senses. The use of wireless technology introduces severe risk and should be approached with extreme caution. The requirements in this section (i.e., controlling and identifying usage, protecting the transmitted data and path, and protecting the system) mitigate these risks.

The requirements that are applicable to all types of wireless communications are presented, followed by requirements that are applicable to a specific part of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., audible, radio frequency, and infrared). These latter requirements only apply to systems using those parts of the spectrum.

There are other concerns when evaluating wireless usage, specifically radio frequency. A device’s radio frequencies usage and the power output are governed by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations and therefore all RF wireless communications devices are subject to the applicable FCC requirements. However, these FCC regulations do not fully address RF wireless interference caused by multiple FCC compliant devices. That is, the RF wireless used in a voting system may be using the same RF wireless of another non-voting wireless system and which may potentially cause a degradation of the wireless performance or a complete wireless failure for the voting system. Sometimes a particular wireless technology permits a power output range, which may be used to overcome interference received from another device. A radio emissions site test can determine the extent of potential existing interference at the location where the wireless voting system is to be used. A radio emission site test can also determine the extent that the RF wireless transmission of the voting system escapes the building in which the RF wireless voting system is used in relationship to Volume I, Section 5: “Telecommunications.”

6.7.1 Relationship to Volume I, Section 5: “Telecommunications.”

6.7.1.1 At a minimum wireless communications shall meet the requirements listed in Volume I, Section 5, “Telecommunications.”

6.7.2 Controlling Usage

6.7.2.1 If wireless communications are used in a voting system, then the vendor shall supply documentation describing how to use all aspects of wireless communications in a secure manner.
6.7.2.1.1 This documentation shall include:
- a complete description of the uses of wireless in the voting system including descriptions of the data elements and signals that are to be carried by the wireless mechanism,
- a complete description of the vulnerabilities associated with this proposed use of wireless, including vulnerabilities deriving from the insertion, deletion, modification, capture, or suppression of wireless messages,
- a complete description of the techniques used to mitigate the risks associated with the described vulnerabilities including techniques used by the vendor to ensure that wireless cannot send or receive messages other than those situations specified in the documentation. Cryptographic techniques shall be carefully and fully described, including a description of cryptographic key generation, management, use, certification, and destruction, and
- a rationale for the inclusion of wireless in the proposed voting system, based on a careful and complete description of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of using wireless for the documented uses compared to using non-wireless approaches.

Discussion: In general, convenience is not a sufficiently compelling reason, on its own, to justify the inclusion of wireless communications in a voting system. If convenience is cited as an advantage of wireless, it shall be balanced against the difficulty of working with cryptographic keys.
6.7.2.1.2 The details of all cryptographic protocols used for wireless communications, including the specific features and data, shall be documented.

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6.7.2.1.3 The wireless documentation shall be closely reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and correctness.

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6.7.2.1.3.1 This review shall be done either through an open and public review or by a subject area recognized expert.

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6.7.2.2 There shall be no undocumented use of the wireless capability, nor shall there be any use of the wireless capability that is not entirely controlled by the voting official.

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Discussion: This can be tested by reviewing all of the software, hardware, and documentation and by testing the status of wireless activity during all phases of testing.

6.7.2.3 If a voting system includes wireless capabilities, then the voting system should be able to accomplish the same function if wireless capabilities are not available due to an error or no service.

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6.7.2.4 The vendor shall provide documentation how to accomplish these functions when wireless is not available.

Voting System Vendor

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6.7.2.5 The system shall be designed and configured such that it is not vulnerable to a single point of failure using wireless communications that causes a total loss of any of voting capabilities.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.7.2.6 If a voting system includes wireless capabilities, then the system shall have the ability to turn on the wireless capability when it is to be used and to turn off the wireless capability when the wireless capability is not in use.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.7.2.7 If a voting system includes wireless capabilities, then the system shall not activate the wireless capabilities without confirmation from a voting official.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.7.3 Identifying Usage

Since there are a wide variety of wireless technologies (both standard and proprietary) and differing physical properties of wireless signals, it is important to identify some of the characteristics of the wireless technologies used in the voting system.
6.7.3.1 If a voting system provides wireless communications capabilities, then there shall be a method for determining the existence of the wireless communications capabilities.

6.7.3.2 If a voting system provides wireless communications capabilities, then there shall be an indication that allows one to determine when the wireless communications (e.g., radio frequencies) capability is active.

6.7.3.3 The indication should be visual.

6.7.3.4 If a voting system provides wireless communications capabilities, then the type of wireless communications used (e.g., radio frequencies) shall be identified either via a label or via the voting systems documentation.
6.7.4 Protecting the Transmitted Data

The transmitted data, especially via wireless communications, needs to be protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity. Examples of election information that needs to be protected include: ballot definitions, ballot instructions (audio), voting device counts, precinct counts, opening of poll signal, and closing of poll signal.

Examples of non-specific election information that needs to be protected include: protocol messages, address or device identification information, and passwords.

Since radio frequency wireless signals radiate in all directions and pass through most construction material, anyone may easily receive the wireless signals. In contrast, infrared signals are line of sight and do not pass through most construction materials. However to a lesser extent, infrared signals can still be received by other devices that are in the line of sight. Similarly, wireless signals can also be easily transmitted by others in order to create unwanted signals. Thus to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the information, encryption is required.

6.7.5 All information transmitted via wireless communications shall be encrypted and authenticated, with the exception of wireless T-coil coupling, to protect against eavesdropping and data manipulation including modification, insertion, and deletion.

6.7.5.1 The encryption shall be as defined in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).”

6.7.5.1.1 The cryptographic modules used shall comply with FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
6.7.5.2 The capability to transmit non-encrypted and non-authenticated information via wireless communications shall not exist.

6.7.5.2.1 If wireless communication (audible) is used, and if the receiver of the wireless transmission is the human ear, then the information shall not be encrypted (i.e., this specifically covers the case of the wireless T-Coil coupling for assistive devices used by people who are hard of hearing - see Volume I, Section 2.2.7.2 DRE standards item c)

6.7.6 Protecting the Wireless Path

With the exception of wireless communications using audible and infrared, it is technically infeasible to use physical means to prevent denial of service (DoS) attacks. If wireless communications are used, then the following capabilities shall exist in order to mitigate the effects of a denial of service (DoS) attack:

6.7.6.1 The voting system shall be able to function properly throughout a DoS attack, since the DoS attack may continue throughout the voting process.

6.7.6.2 The voting system shall function properly as if the wireless capability were never available for use.
6.7.6.3 Alternative procedures or capabilities shall exist to accomplish the same functions that the wireless communications capability would have done.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting

6.7.6.4 The wireless (audible) path shall be protected or shielded.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting

Discussion: Protecting the audible path is a tradeoff between the high volume level necessary for an individual to hear with the low volume level necessary to keep others from hearing, as well as protecting from interference (i.e., noise) from the polling place, voting station, or voting environment. The same is true for the audible path if a voter’s speech is to be captured by the voting device. This wireless communication’s path protection is necessary to protect privacy. Some audio headsets may already satisfy this requirement for the hearing part, while a soundproof voting booth may be necessary in some other cases (e.g., voice recordings).

6.7.7 Infrared

Since infrared has the line-of-sight (LoS) property, securing the wireless path can be accomplished by shielding the path between the wireless communicating devices with an opaque enclosure. However this is only practical for short distances. Additionally, this type of shielding can help to prevent accidental damage to the eyes by the infrared signal.

6.7.7.1 The shielding shall be strong enough to prevent escape of the voting system’s signal, as well as strong enough to prevent infrared saturation jamming.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting
### 6.7.8 Protecting the Voting System from a Wireless-based Attack

The security of the wireless voting system is as important as the information transmitted. If a voting system becomes compromised, there is no way to determine the harm to the system until the compromise is discovered and an investigation is conducted to determine the extent of the damage.

Physical security measures (Volume I, Section 6.3) to prohibit access to a voting system are not possible when using a wireless communications interface. This is similar to when access is through a telecommunications interface, but it is worsened by the fact that there is no wire (physical communication path) to physically secure and by the various physical properties of the electromagnetic spectrum used.

This section covers and reaffirms the applicable overall system capabilities defined in Volume I, Section 2 as well as authentication requirements.

#### 6.7.8.1 The security requirements listed in Volume I, Section 2.2.1 shall be applicable to systems with wireless communications.

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#### 6.7.8.2 The accuracy requirements listed in Volume I, Section 2.2.2 shall be applicable to systems with wireless communications.

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#### 6.7.8.3 The use of wireless communications that may cause impact to the system’s accuracy through electromagnetic stresses is prohibited.

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#### 6.7.8.4 The error recovery requirements listed in Volume I, Section 2.2.3, shall be applicable to systems with wireless communications.

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6.7.9 All wireless communications actions shall be logged.

Discussion: A log of important information is maintained to monitor the wireless communications. This is to ensure that the wireless communications are only used by authorized users with authorized access to authorized devices or services, or to determine if these requirements were not followed. This relates to the system audit requirements (Volume I, Section 2.2.5) and integrity (Volume I, Section 2.2.4), if wireless communications are used.

6.7.9.1 The log shall contain at least the following entries: times wireless activated and deactivated, services accessed, identification of device to which data was transmitted to or received from, identification of authorized user, and successful and unsuccessful attempts to access wireless communications or service.

Discussion: Other information such as the number of frames or packets transmitted or received at various logical layers may be useful, but is dependent on the wireless technology used.

6.7.10 Authentication

Authentication is an important part in the protection and security of the wireless communications. It provides a mechanism to verify the identity and legitimacy of a person, device, services, or system. Authenticating users, devices and services helps to secure the wireless communications and prevent unauthorized access to the system, services and/or information.

6.7.10.1 Device authentication shall occur before any access to, or services from, the voting system are granted through wireless communications.
6.7.10.2 User authentication shall be at least level 2 as per NIST Special Publication 800-63 Version 1.0.1, “Electronic Authentication Guideline.”

6.8 Requirements for Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (Optional)

This section contains requirements for Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) voting systems. VVPAT is not mandatory. These requirements are provided for system certification testing for those states that have decided to include VVPAT as a requirement for their voting systems.

6.8.1 Display and Print a Paper Record

6.8.1.1 The voting system shall print and display a paper record of the voter’s ballot choices prior to the voter making the ballot choices final.

Discussion: This is the basic requirement for VVPAT capability. It requires that the paper record be created as a distinct representation of the voter's ballot choices. It requires that the paper record contain the same information as contained in the electronic record and be suitable for use in verifications and recounts of the election and of the voting station’s electronic records. Thus, either the paper or electronic record could be used as the ballot of record for the election.

6.8.1.2 The paper record shall constitute a complete record of ballot choices that can be used to assess the accuracy of the voting station’s electronic record, to verify the election results, and in full recounts.
Discussion: This requirement exists to make clear that it is possible to use the paper record for checks of the voting station’s accuracy in recording voter’s ballot choices, as well as usable for election audits (such as mandatory 1% recounts). The paper record shall also be suitable for use in full manual recounts of the election.

6.8.1.3 The paper record shall contain all information stored in the electronic record.

Discussion: The electronic record cannot hide any information related to ballot choices; all information relating to ballot choices must be equally present in both records. The electronic record may contain other items that don't necessarily need to be on the paper record, such as digital signature information.
6.8.2 VVPAT Voting Station Usability

6.8.2.1 All usability requirements from Volume I, Section 2.2.7 shall apply to voting stations with VVPAT.

Discussion: The requirements in this section are in addition to those requirements from Section 2.2.7. They require that the paper record be formatted and displayed so that the voter is able to verify his or her votes with maximum reasonable ease and satisfaction, and that instructions be provided to the voter to handle all relevant aspects of the voter verification.

6.8.2.2 The voting station shall be capable of showing the information on the paper in a font size of at least 3.0 mm, and should be capable of showing the information in at least two font ranges, (a) 3.0-4.0 mm and (b) 6.3-9.0 mm, under control of the voter or poll worker.

Discussion: In keeping with requirements in Section 2.2.7, the paper record should use the same font sizes as displayed by the voting station, but at least be capable of 3.0 mm. While larger font sizes may assist most voters with poor vision, certain disabilities such as tunnel vision are best addressed by smaller font sizes.

6.8.2.3 The paper and electronic records shall be presented so as to allow for easy, simultaneous comparison.
6.8.2.3.1 The paper and electronic records shall be positioned so that the voter can, at the same posture, easily read and compare the two records.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting

Discussion: The voter should not have to shift positions when comparing the records.

6.8.2.3.2 If the paper record cannot be displayed in its entirety on a single page, a means shall be provided to allow the voter to view the entire record.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting

Discussion: Possible solutions include scrolling the paper or printing a new sheet of paper.

6.8.2.3.3 If the paper record cannot be displayed in its entirety on a single page, each page of the record shall be numbered and the last page shall be clearly distinguished.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting

6.8.2.4 The instructions for performing the verification process shall be made available to the voter in a location on the voting station.

Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting

Discussion: All instructions need to meet the accessibility requirements contained in Section 2.2.7.

6.8.3 VVPAT Voting Station Accessibility
6.8.3.1 All accessibility requirements from Section 2.2.7 shall apply to voting stations with VVPAT, except as set forth in Section 6.0.2.3.1.2.

Discussion: Requirements in this section are in addition to the accessibility and alternative language requirements from Section 2.2.7. They make explicit that an accessible vote verification procedure for voters be provided at voting sites, including voters with disabilities, limited English proficiency, and voters with Native American and Alaska Native languages that are not written.

6.8.3.2 The voting station shall display, print, and store a paper record in any of the alternative languages chosen for making ballot selections.

Discussion: For the purposes of voter privacy, it must not be possible to identify voters based on their use of alternative languages. Requirement 6.0.2.5.1.3 addresses this issue.

6.8.3.3 For the purposes of verification, candidate names on the records shall be in English.

Discussion: This requirement is included to assist manual auditing of the paper records.

6.8.3.4 Other markings not related to ballot selection on the paper record shall be in English.
Discussion: Other markings may include designations of the precinct and the election.

6.8.3.5 If the normal voting procedure includes VVPAT, the accessible voting station should provide features that enable voters who are blind to perform this verification.

Voting System Vendor

Discussion: This requirement is repeated from Section 2.2.7 and included here for emphasis. This requirement will be mandatory in future versions.

6.8.4 Approve or Spoil the Paper Record

6.8.4.1 The voting station shall allow the voter to approve or spoil the paper record.

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Discussion: The voting station cannot create an electronic record without its corresponding paper record. It requires that the voting station mark the electronic record as accepted or spoiled in the voter's presence, and if spoiled, the corresponding electronic record be marked as spoiled and be preserved. It requires that the voting station display a warning message when a spoil limit is reached.

6.8.4.2 The voting station shall, in the presence of the voter, mark the paper record as being accepted by the voter or spoiled.

Voting System Vendor

Discussion: If a paper record is marked as spoiled, then the corresponding electronic record is presented to the voter for update.
6.8.4.3 The voting station should mark and preserve electronic and paper records that have been spoiled.

V Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

Discussion: For the purposes of reconciliation of records, electronic and paper spoiled records should be retained and analyzed.

6.8.4.4 Following the close of polls, a means shall be provided to reconcile the number of spoiled paper records with the number of occurrences of spoiled electronic records, and procedures shall be in place to address any discrepancies.

V Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

6.8.4.5 Prior to the maximum number of spoiled ballots occurring, the voting station shall display a warning message to the voter indicating that the voter may spoil only one more ballot.

V Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

Discussion: The maximum number of spoiled ballots varies from state to state.

6.8.4.6 If the maximum number of spoiled ballots occurs, the voting station should provide a way to permit the voter to cast a ballot, as required.

V Voting System Vendor

Pre-Voting  Voting  Post-Voting

Discussion: Possible solutions include using other equipment, using a paper ballot, or accepting the last ballot cast. This capability defined by state and local jurisdiction.
6.8.4.7 The voting system should not record the electronic record as being approved by the voter until the paper record has been stored.

Discussion: In general it is better not to record any record as being approved until the record that is independent of the voting system is approved by the voter.

6.8.4.7 Vendor documentation shall include procedures for returning a voting station to correct operation after a voter has used it incompletely or incorrectly; this procedure shall not cause discrepancies between the tallies of the electronic and paper records.

6.8.5 Preserve Voter Privacy and Anonymity

6.8.5.1 The voter’s privacy and anonymity shall be preserved during the process of recording, verifying, and auditing ballot choices.

Discussion: Privacy requirements from Section 2.2.7 apply to voting stations with VVPAT; requirements in this section are in addition to those requirements from Section 2.2.7. They require that the voter’s privacy be maintained during the verification step, including requirements that the paper record contain no human or machine-readable markings that could identify the voter and that the paper and electronic records be stored in ways that preserve the privacy and anonymity of the voter. The privacy and anonymity of the voter's verification of his or her ballot choices on the electronic and paper records shall be maintained.
6.8.5.1.1 When the voter is responsible for depositing a paper record in the ballot box, the accessible voting station shall maintain the privacy and anonymity of voters unable to manually handle paper.

V Voting System Vendor

6.8.5.2 The electronic and paper records shall be created and stored in ways that preserve the privacy and anonymity of the voter.

V Voting System Vendor

Discussion: This can be accomplished in various ways including shuffling the order of the records or other methods to separate the order of stored records.

6.8.5.3 The privacy and anonymity of voters whose paper records contain any of the alternative languages chosen for making ballot selections shall be maintained.

V Voting System Vendor

Discussion: One method for accomplishing this is to ensure that no less than, e.g., five voters use any of the alternative languages for their ballot selections.

6.8.5.4 The voter shall not be able to leave the voting area with the paper record if the information on the paper record can directly reveal the voter’s choices.

V Voting System Vendor

6.8.5.5 Unique identifiers shall not be displayed in a way that is easily memorable by the voter.

V Voting System Vendor
Discussion: Unique identifiers on the paper record are displayed or formatted in such a way that they are not memorable to voters, such as by obscuring them in other characters.

6.8.6 Electronic and Paper Record Structure

6.8.6.1 The voting system’s ballot records shall be structured and contain information so as to support highly precise audits of their accuracy.

Discussion: This requires that electronic records and paper records contain election precinct information, information to link the paper record to its corresponding electronic record, and information identifying the voting station. It requires that the electronic records be maintained in a format that can be exported to a different computer, e.g., a personal computer, and that the format be well-documented to support analysis of the records.

6.8.6.2 All cryptographic software in the voting system should be approved by the U.S. Government's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) as applicable.

Discussion: The voting station may use cryptographic software for a number of different purposes, including calculating checksums, encrypting records, authentication, generating random numbers, and digital signatures. This software should be reviewed and approved by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program. There may be cryptographic voting schemes where the cryptographic algorithms used are necessarily different from any algorithms that have approved CMVP implementations, thus CMVP approved software should be used where feasible but is not required. The CMVP web site is http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval.
6.8.6.3 The electronic and paper records shall include information about the election.

V  Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

6.8.6.3.1 The voting system shall be able to include an identification of the particular election, the voting site/precinct, and the voting station.

V  Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

Discussion: If the voting site and precinct are different, both should be included. Some of this information may have to be excluded in certain cases to protect voter privacy.

6.8.6.3.2 The records shall include information identifying whether the balloting is provisional, early, or on Election Day, and information that identifies the ballot style in use.

V  Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

6.8.6.3.3 The records shall include a voting session identifier that is generated when the voting system is placed in voting mode and that can be used to identify the records as being created during that voting session.

V  Voting System Vendor

| Pre-Voting | Voting | Post-Voting |

Discussion: If there are several voting sessions on the same voting station on the same day, the voting session identifiers must be different. They should be generated from a random number generator.
6.8.6.4 The electronic and paper records shall be linked by including a unique identifier within each record that can be used to identify each record uniquely and each record’s corresponding record.

Discussion: The identifier serves the purpose of uniquely identifying the record so as to identify duplicates and/or for crosschecking two record types.

6.8.6.5 The voting system should generate and store a digital signature for each electronic record.

6.8.6.6 The electronic records shall be able to be exported for auditing or analysis on standards based and/or COTS information technology computing platforms.

6.8.6.6.1 The exported electronic records shall be in a publicly available, non-proprietary format.

Discussion: It is advantageous when all electronic records, regardless of manufacturer, use the same format or can easily be converted to a publicly available, non-proprietary format, e.g., the OASIS Election Markup Language (EML) Standard.

6.8.6.6.2 The voting system should export the records accompanied by a digital signature of the collection of records, which shall be
calculated on the entire set of electronic records and their associated digital signatures.

Discussion: This is necessary to determine if records are missing or substituted.

6.8.6.6.3 The voting system vendor shall provide documentation as to the structure of the exported records and how they shall be read and processed by software.

Discussion: There may be a future requirement for some commonality in the format of paper records.

6.8.6.7 The paper record should be created in a format that may be made available across different manufacturers of electronic voting systems.

Discussion: The paper record shall be created such that its contents are machine-readable.
Discussion: This can be done by using specific OCR fonts.

### 6.8.6.8.1 The paper record should contain error correcting codes for the purposes of detecting read errors and for preventing other markings on the paper record to be misinterpreted when machine reading the paper record.

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Discussion: This requirement is not mandatory if a state prohibits non-human-readable information on the paper record. This requirement serves the purpose of detecting scanning errors and preventing stray or deliberate markings on the paper from being interpreted as valid data.

### 6.8.6.9 Any automatic accumulation of electronic or paper records shall be capable of detecting and discarding duplicate copies of the records.

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### 6.8.6.10 The voting system should be able to print a barcode with each paper record that contains the human readable contents of the paper record and digital signature information.

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Discussion: This requirement is not mandatory if a state prohibits non-human-readable information on the paper record.

### 6.8.6.10.1 The barcode shall use an industry-standard format and shall be able to be read using readily available commercial technology.
Discussion: Examples of such codes are Maxi Code or PDF417.

6.8.6.10.2 If the paper record's corresponding electronic record contains a digital signature, the digital signature shall be included in the barcode.

6.8.6.10.3 The barcode shall not contain any information other than the paper record’s human readable content and digital signature information.

6.8.6.11 The voting system vendor shall provide full documentation of procedures for exporting its electronic records and reconciling its electronic records with its paper records.

6.8.7 Equipment Security and Reliability

6.8.7.1 The voting station equipment shall be secure, reliable, and easily maintained.
6.8.7.2  The voting station shall be physically secure from tampering, including intentional damage.

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6.8.7.2.1  The voting station shall provide a standard, publicly documented printer port (or the equivalent) using a standard communication protocol.

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Discussion: Using a standard, publicly documented printer protocol assists in security evaluations of system software.

6.8.7.2.2  The paper path between the printing, viewing and storage of the paper record shall be protected and sealed from access except by authorized election officials.

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6.8.7.2.3  The printer shall not be permitted to communicate with any other system or machine other than the single voting machine to which it is connected.

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6.8.7.2.4  The printer shall only be able to function as a printer; it shall not contain any other services (e.g., provide copier or fax functions) or network capability.

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6.8.7.2.5  Printer access to replace consumables such as ink or paper shall only be possible if it does not compromise the sealed printer paper path.

Voting System Vendor

6.8.7.2.6  The ballot box storing the paper records shall be sealed and secured and no access shall be provided to poll workers.

Voting System Vendor

6.8.7.2.7  Tamper-evident seals or physical security measures shall protect the connection between the printer and the voting system, so that the connection cannot be broken or interfered with without leaving extensive and obvious evidence.

Voting System Vendor

6.8.7.3  The voting system's printer shall be highly reliable and easily maintained.

Voting System Vendor

6.8.7.3.2  The voting system should detect errors and malfunctions such as paper jams or low supplies of consumables such as paper and ink that may
prevent paper records from being correctly displayed, printed, or stored.

Discussion: This could be accomplished in a variety of different ways: for example, a printer that is out of paper or jammed could issue audible alarms, with the alarm different for each condition.

6.8.7.3.3 If errors or malfunctions occur, the voting system shall suspend voting operations and should present a clear indication to the voter and election officials of the malfunctions.

Discussion: The voting station does not record votes if errors or malfunctions occur.

6.8.7.3.4 Printing devices should either (a) contain paper and ink of sufficient capacity so as not to require reloading or opening equipment covers or enclosures and thus potential circumvention of security features, or (b) be able to reload paper and ink with minimal disruption to voting and without circumvention of security features such as seals.

6.8.7.3.5 Vendor documentation shall include procedures for investigating and resolving printer malfunctions including, but not limited to, printer operations, misreporting of votes, unreadable paper records, and power failures.
6.8.7.3.6 Vendor documentation shall include printer reliability information including mean time between failure information and shall include recommendations for appropriate numbers of backup printers and printer supplies.

6.8.7.4 Protective coverings intended to be transparent on voting station devices shall be maintainable via a predefined cleaning process. If the coverings become damaged such that they obscure the paper record, they shall be replaceable.

6.8.7.5 The paper record shall be sturdy, clean, and of sufficient durability to be used for verifications, reconciliations, and recounts conducted manually and via machine reading equipment.